EARLY MODERN LITERARY STUDIES

Authority and the Problem of Other Minds in Shakespeare's 'Henriad'

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The critical tradition surrounding the Henriad plays has long been divided along the fault line of Prince Hal's supposed princely virtues.[1] James D. Mardock calls *Henry V* the 'most divisive of Shakespeare's histories, the play that more than any other in the canon

[1] E.M.W. Tillyard's study, *The Elizabethan World Picture* (1943; repr. London: Pimlico, 1998), articulates the 'Tudor myth' interpretation, where Hal represents a correction of the long historical tragedy of the lost ideal of medieval hierarchy. For Tillyard, Elizabethans viewed the usurpation of Richard II as a sort of cosmic fall that brought about the Wars of the Roses, which only the marriage of Henry VII and the ascent of the Tudor dynasty finally resolved. In spite of all the violent reprisals and chaotic double-dealing in the plays, Tillyard's reading describes natural law serving as a backdrop to the dramatic action of the plays. For Tillyard, the history plays present a fairly straight-forward apologetic for this hierarchical understanding of the world, with Hal acting as a nationalist hero by taking his place at the top of a neoplatonic chain of being. Since Tillyard, many critics have worked to demythologize this narrative. In 1968 Sigurd Burkhardt, for instance, saw Falstaff as particularly defying the nationalist message described by Tillyard, arguing that Shakespeare was aware of the Tudor myth where Elizabeth serves as the endpoint of a historical *telos*, but presents a much more ambivalent thematic take, where England was tethered to *de facto* rule as readily as to divine hierarchy. See *Shakespearean Meanings* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). Other notable examples include *Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism*, ed. by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), and *Alternative Shakespeares*, ed. by John Drakakis and Terence Hawkes (London: Methuen, 1985). But critical division has strayed somewhat from this binary, and there have been many readings unconcerned with either interpretive pole, such as that of Hugh Grady, in 'Falstaff: Subjectivity between the Carnival and the Aesthetic', *The Modern Language Review* 96. 3 (2001) 609-23, who sees Falstaff as less a paragon of resistance to the Tudor model so much as the embodiment of raw conceptual potentiality, that which mirrors Hal's own youthful potential in his days before he takes up against Hotspur and earns his father's respect. Grady chides historical readings altogether, particularly where Falstaff is concerned, recognizing the myriad historical and mythological precedents into which Falstaff can be enlisted as a sign of the very subjectivity that such historical readings, at times, are meaning to sidestep. Grady writes on the historicists, 'in defining the influence of ideology and discourse on the subject, they have too often eliminated the subject as such, producing uneven, at times unworkably deterministic theoretical models' (p. 609).

has tended to produce binary and irreconcilable reactions', particularly centered around the 'unresolved portrait of its central character'.[2] Is Hal a hero, uniting England against a host of enemies, resolving a crisis of authority at the upper reaches of government? Or is he something less than that, a manipulating scoundrel or a mouthpiece for nationalist rhetoric? So long-standing is this rift that it has come to present less of an intractable problem for readers than an accepted, even celebrated attribute of the play cycle. Like Hamlet's delay or Othello's credulity, the issue of Hal's dubious merits as a prince ultimately enriches rather than confounds the plays; it constitutes a feature, not a bug. But, as I will show, that is not to say that the question of Hal does not pose real interpretive problems, particularly because, as Norman Rabkin argues, many takes on Hal seem so fully realized and internally consistent.[3] Referencing the work of gestalt psychologists, and particularly the rabbit/duck thought experiment, Rabkin argues that Hal's doubleness necessarily takes us out of the interpretive process, or at least makes us awkwardly switch back and forth between two 'whole hearted responses', from different 'interpretations that seem based on total readings of a consistent whole'.[4] I agree with Rabkin that Hal's difference can probably best be interpreted psychologically, particularly when using illusion as a guiding metaphor. But I would like to delve deeper into some of the philosophical underpinnings of his claims, and what they might mean for the interpretive strategy one should take toward Hal. Given the various and contradictory critical takes on Hal's character, perhaps it would clarify the issue to consider these arguments as commonly falling under a different problem of interpretation – the problem of other minds.

A.J. Ayer describes the problem of other minds in terms of the opaqueness of the other, the need to infer other people's inward mental experiences on the basis of analogy between their behavior and one's own.[5] However, sovereignty presents a special problem

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[2] James D. Mardock,'The Critical Backstory' in *King Henry V: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Line Cotteignes and Karen Britland (London: Bloomsbury, The Arden Shakespeare, 2019), pp. 19-46 (pp. 19, 20).

[3] Norman Rabkin, 'Rabbits, Ducks, and Henry V', *Shakespeare Quarterly* 28. 3 (1977), 279-96. Quoting E.H. Gombrich, Rabkin writes:'[W]e are compelled to look for what is 'really there', to see the shape apart from its interpretation, and this, we soon discover, is not really possible. True, we can switch from one reading to another with increasing rapidity; we will also 'remember' the rabbit while we see the duck, but the more closely we watch ourselves, the more certainly we will discover that we cannot experience alternative readings at the same time… [W]e cannot, strictly speaking, watch ourselves having an illusion' (p. 280).

[4] Ibid.

[5] '[T]he only ground that I can have for believing that other people have experiences, and that some at least of their experiences are of the same character as my own, is that their overt behavior is similar to mine. I know that certain features of my own behavior are associated with certain experiences, and when I observe other people behaving in similar ways I am entitled to infer, by analogy, that they are having similar

for the interpretive process that Ayer, and many others, have described, particularly in the king's extraordinary subjective power. For instance, Prince Hal shows a marked inconsistency between word and deed in the plays, which suggests a sort of duplicity or bad faith. At times his actions are subject to law, and other times not, and where the behavior of the other does not follow known conceptual models, then the inward mentality of that behavior becomes particularly opaque, existing beyond the reach of the epistemological inference Ayer describes. This all suggests problems at center of sovereignty where inferring the interiority of other minds is concerned, problems that can be framed as an inability to place the king's mind in relation to the society he leads. One of the major themes of the Henriad plays involves shifting theories of authority, such that the opaqueness and otherness of the mind of the sovereign becomes a crisis of authority at the upper reaches of government. Hal shows that he is a hypocrite, in the Greek sense of *ὑποκριτής*, 'an actor on the stage, pretender, dissembler', particularly where he learns to muster the illusory tricks of natural royalty in service of *de facto* authority (*OED*). While Rabkin observes that illusion serves as a useful lens in interpreting Hal's character, I argue that Hal's claim to authority is itself a sort of illusion – a projection of his imagined self on the stage of state. Furthermore, in learning to seem the part of the king, Hal's illusory pretense crosses into the realm of Cartesian self-realization, where he imagines his authority through a sort of pseudo-*cogito*.[6] Hal's assumption of state power, thus,

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experiences. There are philosophers who accept all these propositions and to them the question how one is to justify one's belief in the existence of other minds presents no special difficulty… To many philosophers, however, this argument from analogy appears too weak for its purpose; some of them indeed…maintain that it is altogether invalid…'; see A.J. Ayer, 'One's Knowledge of Other Minds', *Theoria* 19. 1-2 (1953), 1-20 (p. 2).

[6] The problem of other minds obviously would not have been explicated in its modern form in Shakespeare's day, though something like it was mentioned in René Descartes' *Meditations*; see Gideon Manning, 'Descartes, Other Minds and Impossible Human Bodies', *Philosophers' Imprint* 12. 6 (2012), 1-24 (p. 4). But the problem also predates Descartes and appears often in various forms in early modern culture. For instance, Katherine Eisaman Maus brings attention to an instance, as stated by early modern religious polemicist Thomas Wright in *The Passions of the Mind in Generall*: 'For we cannot enter into a man's heart, and view the passions of inclinations which there reside and lie hidden; therefore, as philosophers by effects find out causes…even so we must trace out passions and inclinations by some effects and eternal operations'; see *Inwardness and Theater in the English Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 29. Indeed the problem of other minds seems somewhat embedded within the skeptical approach itself. In 'On repenting', Montaigne writes of the importance of tuning one's own moral compass, while reflecting on one's lack of knowledge concerning the inward morality of others. 'I restrain my actions according to the standards of others, but I enlarge them according to my own. No one but you knows whether you are base and cruel, or loyal and dedicated. Others never see you: they surmise from uncertain conjectures; they do not see your nature so much as your artifice. So do not cling to their sentence: cling to your own'; see *The Complete Essays*, ed. by M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 911. Hamlin describes Montaigne's attitude toward the minds of others as an example of the 'be/seem

comes by way of Cartesian self-identity, where his methodology for assuming kingly power closely parallels the method for assuming the existence of one's own mind, according to René Descartes. Hal performs an illusion to his audience of state, even while, at times, allowing his dramatic audience the privilege of seeing behind the curtain of his otherness.

In this article I will discuss sovereignty as a problem of other minds in the Henriad plays. Characters in the Henriad are constantly grappling not only with new ways to think about authority but with new methods for communicating and knowing with regard to that authority, new ways to understand loyalty and obedience to the king, both to his person and to the concepts that undergird his place as head of state. While Rabkin's work articulates certain aspects of the problem of interpretation, or the binary nature of Hal's character in the plays as illustrated by the rabbit/duck thought experiment that Rabkin discusses, I will argue that the problem of other minds serves as a more apt critical lens with which to view these several issues concerning authority in the Henriad. I focus on Hal as a character who represents the end result of an evolutionary process from theories of vertically-construed authority to theories where subjects learn to interpret meaning horizontally between embodied minds of their sovereign rulers. Likewise, I describe Hal as a 'Cartesian anti-hero', a character who enlists Cartesian ideas to further his own personal agenda and establish his place at the head of English monarchy.

I: Keeping Sovereignty in Mind

The problem of other minds as an interpretive lens for the Henriad plays becomes useful particularly concerning the plays' depiction of the struggle for rule and their discussion of new ideas about the sovereignty of the king. Ernst Kantorowicz describes the conceptual model of 'the king's two bodies' as a necessary fiction perpetuated in English law, and borrowed liberally from Christian theology, to shore up the legal status of the

topos' mentioned above, citing a wide variety of textual sources on being and seeming besides Montaigne, including Duncan's line in *Macbeth*, "There's no art / To find the mind's construction in the face", and Hamlet's concern with the 'trappings and the suits of woe'; see William M. Hamlin, *Tragedy and Scepticism in Shakespeare's England* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 131. Maus, meanwhile, connects the dots between other minds, 'being and seeming', and interpretation as a distinct early modern mode of subjectivity. She notes that '[t]he "problem of other minds" as it engages English Renaissance thinkers and writers' causes one to take up interpretation, or the negotiation between being and seeming, as a necessity of daily life, where 'social life demands the constant practice of induction' (p. 36).

sovereign, particularly in the event of the king's death.[7] As Richard Halpern writes in his reassessment of Kantorowicz's groundbreaking book, where Carl Schmitt's description of sovereignty focuses on the 'sundering… of the state of emergency from ordinary conditions' and the 'slicing of… the continuum of the natural order', Kantorowicz emphasized 'not separation but continuity: of reign to kingly reign, and of monarch to the constitutional body of which he forms the head'.[8] However, another sense of duality somewhat undoes the binding move Halpern describes – the ontological differentiation of the private mind and the public body of the king. As Line Cottegnies writes, '[t]he issues of legitimacy and rebellion are… consistently posed in terms of the loss of mutual, *personal* trust between the king and his peers, before becoming a crisis of trust in the monarchy'.[9] As the early modern European monarch sets his- or herself up within a model of personal rule, living as a subject under that rule increasingly entails not the navigation of a set of conceptual loyalties that arrange themselves within a neoplatonic hierarchy. Rather it entails dealing with a person with a house style and their own authorial voice. Likewise, as the king's rule becomes more personal, it inevitably becomes more interpersonal, and as the problem of other minds signals the complicated, sometimes implacable nature of interpersonal relations, so will a system of government recently become more (inter)personal reflect that problem. Whereas Cottegnies characterizes the lack of 'trust' at the center of English monarchy in terms of needful Machiavellian dissimulations, which, again, recall Rabkin's metaphor of illusion, my argument positions such epistemic questions of seeming in terms of their ontological implications. The needfulness of royal seeming constitutes only half the story; the way that seeming entails *being* in Cartesian philosophy adds another dimension to the duality of the king.

Many literary critics who write on the subject of English kings invoke the work of Giorgio Agamben, and his invocation of Schmittian sovereignty, but few acknowledge the overlap of ideas between Agamben's ideas and Descartes's conception of mind as a 'thinking thing' and the parallelism between the duality of mind/body and that of the inside and outside of juridical order.[10] Philip Lorenz notes that Agamben's 'theories of sovereignty

[7] Kantorowicz explains the king's two bodies, of course, throughout his book, though perhaps most definitively in the introduction. The concepts theological underpinnings are explained at length in his third chapter, 'Christ-Centered Kingship'. See *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[8] Richard Halpern, 'The King's Two Buckets: Kantorowicz, *Richard II*, and Fiscal *Trauerspiel*' *Representations* 106. 1 (2009), 67-76 (p. 70).

[9] '"What trust is in these times?" Thinking the Secular State with "the colour of religion" in Shakespeare's *2 Henry IV*'. *Études Anglaises* 71.4 (2018), 424-41 (p. 428). Emphasis in original.

[10] To name just a few, see Andreas Mahler's 'States of Exception on the English Stage: Political and aesthetic sovereignty in *King Lear*, *Hamlet* and *The Duchess of Malfi*', *Poetica* 48.3/4 (2016) 333-67;

identify conceptual borders between an inside and an outside of various orders – legal, logical, and metaphysical – only to then posit their collapse into "zones of indistinguishability"'.[11] Agamben refers to such zones as the 'state of exception', which come into being when the sovereign declares an emergency such that law must be suspended, or where the sovereign takes action for the preservation of the state outside, or in exception of, the law. As Agamben writes, the 'paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order'.[12] The way this paradox of sovereignty takes shape significantly resembles the logical moves within Descartes's *cogito* and illustrates a conceptual debt to the philosophical tradition that culminates in Cartesian mind. In either case, a subjective entity reveals itself by referring to the logical possibility of its existence both against, and on account of, a rule of objective import. In either case, it is both *against* and *because* the objectively and authoritatively defined rule becomes imposed inwardly – whether in the mind or in the state – that a subjectivity comes into its own strength and gains a certain outwardly oriented reality.[13] For Agamben, the sovereign takes shape *because* it declares itself

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Nichole Miller's 'Sacred Life and Sacrificial Economy: Coriolanus in No-Man's Land', *Criticism* 51.2 (2009) 263-310; or Katrin Beushausen's 'Dangerous Fracture: Undermining the Order of the Law in Sophocles's *Antigone*', *Mosaic: A Journal For the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature* 41.4 (2008), 15-30.

[11] Philip Lorenz, *The Tears of Sovereignty: Perspectives of Power in Renaissance Drama* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), pp. 7-8.

[12] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 15.

[13] One could reasonably ask how the phrase 'a rule of objective import' describes law. I do not mean law as 'objective' in the sense that it represents objective truth, where ideas about objectivity uphold law, or where legal conventions become supported by empirical veridicality. Rather the early modern move away from legal theory as centered around natural law toward positivist theories also entailed that the legislative bodies that create positive law act on the basis of what David Kastan has called 'horizontal' authority. By 'object-oriented' here I mean horizontally construed – whether through rhetoric or force – as opposed to authority granted by appeal to a neoplatonic hierarchy of God and Man. But this claim is tricky, because part of the rhetoric employed within the horizontal orientation I mean would make quite liberal use of appeals to the hierarchical relation between God and Man. There is a sense where the idea of the 'Divine Right of Kings' describes *both* a horizontally conceived authority, in that the king in parliament rules through proclamation and as well the martial strength to uphold such creative powers, *and* to vertically conceived authority, in that the king supposedly receives his right 'divinely' through an emanative relation to natural law and God. Different uses of the phrase 'Divine Right of Kings', in this sense, could be an area for further study; however, I am here concerned mainly with the distinction *between* the growing sense of the king's positivist legal authority and the slowly dwindling sense of the king's authority as understood as a result of natural law. Hal represents a model of the king who makes expert use of the rhetoric of hierarchy, though he does so in service to a horizontally construed or positivistic theory of law. But the very fact of his dissembling – in particular, the soliloquies he gives concerning his own intentions to dramatize his ascent to power – speak to his lack of faith in neoplatonic hierarchy, even while he appeals to that hierarchy

against a rule of law; in a similar manner, the Cartesian mind takes shape *because* it declares itself against a rule of object-oriented skepticism. In both cases, it is the thinking that makes it so – not some rule handed down from on high. And in fact, from a certain point of view, the inside and outside of law that, in Agamben's concept of sovereignty collapses into a paradoxical unity, can be said to be the same dualist inside and outside of mind described by Descartes, except here embedded in the mind of this sovereign ruler. Agamben makes use of the Aristotelian distinction between different modes of life – *zoe*, 'which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings' and *bios* or the political life, 'which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group'.[14] Just as for Agamben, where the 'sovereign exception' constitutes 'a zone of indistinction between nature and right', so for Descartes the *cogito* constitutes a collapse of what William M. Hamlin calls the 'be/seem topos', or the distinction between that which *seems to be* within a skepticism concerning human senses and that which *is* according to rationalist metaphysics. The Cartesian collapse of being and seeming closely parallels the Agambenian collapse of *zoe* and *bios*. Descartes's system entails a foundationalism of *a priori* reasoning, casting off both the commonplace empirical generalizations of scholastic Aristotelianism and the metaphysics of neoplatonism; Agamben's sovereign, likewise, appeals to a certain *a priori* reasoning concerning their own power to exact government. Descartes meant to merge metaphysics and logic, founding a system recognizing causal implications from the self-evident to the evident, overcoming the problems for perception and cognition embedded within contingent reality by pointing to the rational substructure of cognition itself, as evident within the mind's capacity to reason deductively from intuition.[15] Agamben's sovereign, likewise, moves from the self-evident to the evident, in that what is evidentially legal to the mind of the sovereign becomes legal precedent. In other words, mind and king assert their existence in similar ways – where both acknowledge and transcend contingent frameworks to establish their executive authority.

I argue that sovereignty as a political concept should be placed in context with the broader historical emergence of the rationalist approach to knowledge and identity. As W.S. Holdsworth writes, Jean Bodin's absolutist definition of sovereignty 'gave an explanation of existing political facts' concerning the centralization of government in Europe during

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as a way to further his own legend and establish his own power. See David Scott Kastan, *Shakespeare After Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1999)

[14] Agamben, p. 1.

[15] Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, Volume IV: Descartes to Leibniz* (Garden City: Image, 1985), pp. 72-3.

the early modern period.[16] Stephen L. Collins and Alice L. Savage, meanwhile, contextualize the emergence of sovereignty against the rise of consciousness as a mode of personal identity. Collins and Savage note that '[c]onsciousness… appears as the quality of perceiving order in things. And the history of consciousness is concomitantly a history of changes in modes of perception and modes of communication; it is thus a history of different "orders"… Order is the perceived historical interpretation of consciousness and social reality'.[17] But the context for this transition is wider than Collins and Savage acknowledge. Collins and Savage invoke Hobbes's *Leviathan* as an important benchmark in the development of sovereignty as a political concept, but Hobbesian nominalism, as a permutation of Ockhamism, figures as only one feature of a broader philosophical shift. Sixteenth century thought shifts from the metaphysical preoccupations of the medieval era to include more epistemological approaches. The advent of skepticism plays an important role through the influence of new translations of the works of Sextus Empiricus, through the continuing academic skeptical influence of Tacitus in humanist thought, and through what Richard Popkin calls the 'intellectual crisis of the Reformation'.[18] While Bodin himself was explicitly anti-skeptical, one can contextualize the rise of sovereignty as 'an explanatory concept' within these epistemological permutations, as well. Sovereignty positions authority within the mandate of one ruler, or at least one body of rulers; this, in turn, causes obedience to that ruler to become a matter of interpreting his or her or their intentions, their mental disposition. The tradition culminating in Descartes's work in mind thus offers a sort of meta-explanation to theories of sovereignty – a line of thought into which both Bodin's and Agamben's definitions can be enlisted, and a constellation of thought that becomes evident in the Henriad as an artifact of emerging concepts of personal rule.

The dilemma of the Henriad plays – or the power vacuum that Hal steps into – takes shape where the metaphysical and social basis for royal claims to authority begins to become distinct and to diverge. In the plays, royal subjects come to expect both impersonal and personal rule at once; they want hierarchical authority underwritten by God, as well as

[16] 'Law was no longer a rule of conduct which taught men '*honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere'.* Rather it was *quod principi placuit* – the command of the sovereign. Customary law was only law so long as he suffered it to exist. Both the existence of law and its contents depended upon him alone; and in this fact the whole essence of sovereignty was summed up'; see W.S. Holdsworth, *A History of English Law*, Book IV, vol. 5 (London: Methuen, 1922-1972), pp. 292-3.

[17] Stephen L. Collins and Alice L. Savage, 'Consciousness, Order, and Social Reality: Towards an "Historical" Integration of the Human Sciences', *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 11. 1 (1983/84), 86-102 (pp. 92-3).

[18] Richard H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 3.

openness of access and recognition of their particular concerns. As this process ensues, the mind of the king increasingly becomes a difficult, almost unreadable object of interpretation. Note the evident fracture between the expectations of subjects and the rituals of dispensing the royal will from the very beginning of *Richard II*. For instance, in the opening scene where Mowbray and Bollingbroke bring their quarrel to the king, Bollingbroke projects confused ideas about royal duty, making contradictory requests of Richard. Both disputants begin their entreaties by taking note of the other's royal blood, even while they accuse each other; then, in an act of dramatic defiance, Bollingbroke denies his own hereditary connection to the throne, saying he 'disclaim[s] the kindred of the king, / And lay[s] aside [his] high blood's royalty, / Which fear, not reverence, makes thee [Mowbray] to except' (1.1.79-81).[19] The distinction between fear and reverence signals the difference between two approaches to the king's glory in Bollingbroke's reckoning; he claims that his enemy approaches the king out of base servility and, in a show of disgust for this sort of gesture, proceeds to sever his own relation to the king for the purposes both of distinguishing his own reverent honor from Mowbray's 'fear'-ful deference, and forgoing his royal privilege to better illustrate the justness of his complaint. He need not claim royal lineage to prove the rightness of his claim, or so he thinks. Bollingbroke's gesture starts a cascade of posturing on both disputants' parts that ends with nobody seeming able to understand or articulate their right relation to royal authority. They submit themselves to impartial adjudication, rather than appeal to Richard as a judge naturally endowed with God's own justice, a role Richard unwisely takes up, granting Bollingbroke the bracketing of his own blood relation to the king (1.1.114-23). Richard claims his eyes and ears are 'impartial' and 'Should nothing privilege him nor partialize / The unstooping firmness of [his] upright soul' in his capacity to hear their claims against each other. In that the role of judge becomes one that Richard inhabits in his own 'upright soul', he claims to discern their cases by means of his own individual cognitive powers, not by virtue of his royal blood or what that position signifies with reference to his relation to God's own righteousness. Richard forgoes the model of truth as flowing into his consciousness within the accepted neoplatonic hierarchy of forms, wherein he stands as God's lieutenant, and takes up a much more horizontally construed model of authority. But as we shall see, this move ends disastrously for him.

Even though Richard promises to hand down judgement impartially, he initially proceeds to address the dispute between Mowbray and Bollingbroke through delegated authority, as if out of habit. Horizontal, or socially-construed, authority had been promised but

[19] References to Shakespeare's plays are taken from *The Riverside Shakespeare*, gen. ed. by G. Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973). All subsequent quotations to Shakespeare's plays are taken from this edition and will be cited parenthetically.

hierarchical power, at least at first, and seemingly reflexively, still takes precedence in the legal ritual between these two disputants. Richard bids John of Gaunt to order his son Bollingbroke to throw down Mowbray's gage; Richard himself orders Mowbray to throw down Bollingbroke's. By order each party is urged to call truce. But neither Bollingbroke nor Mowbray can abide this appeal to delegated power; they insist that such ritual fails the righteousness of their claims and press the king to uphold his promise to dole out impartial, which is to say horizontal, judgement, but also, and crucially, to recognize the individual honor either party would lose in obedience to delegated authority. 'My life thou shalt command, but not my shame', Mowbray proclaims. 'The one my duty owes, but my fair name, / Despite of death that lives upon my grave, / To dark dishonor's use thou shalt not have' (1.1.166-9). Reputation here takes shape not by way of any step-wise hierarchical relation to the king but through interpersonal relation with him. 'Command' would resolve the legal issue, but not Mowbray's personal sense of 'shame'. Mowbray pledges dutiful behavior, but the injustice done to him cannot be answered by duty alone but only by personal restitution, on the part of the king and Bollingbroke himself. What emerges is a confusion about what constitutes 'personal' dealing. Both disputants wish for Richard's ruling to be made on the basis of the self-evident merits of either case, rather than the truth as evident only to Richard himself, which he would dispense as God's own judgment – thus they ask for an 'impartial' judge. But of course both make this request as an appeal to Richard's personal recognition of the rightness of either disputant's case. So they wish for Richard to remove the 'personal' bonds between them (as dictated by blood relation, emanating from God to subjects through customary hereditary bonds) to take up a 'personal' (as in direct, or not mediated) attitude toward them. Mowbray professes his 'shame' to be a function of his 'reputation' and his 'honor', but even more so his own individual investment in these virtues, setting up an anxious dualism between behavioral 'duty' and 'reputation' or 'honor'. 'Mine honor is my life, both grow in one', Mowbray says, implying that 'duty' is not naturally his 'honor' (1.1.182). Bollingbroke, for his part, in response to Mowbray reasserts his proximal relation to the king's own glory, in what seems to be a muddled attempt to mirror the personal claims made by Mowbray while also forgoing the hierarchical basis for those claims. Bollingbroke says, 'Shall I…with pale beggar-fear impeach my height / Before this outdar'd dastard?' (1.1.188-90). For Bollingbroke, to accept the order to throw down Mowbray's gage would reflect 'The slavish motive of recanting fear' (1.1.193), placing himself within the influence of the less desired side of the distinction between 'fear' and 'reverence' already mentioned, and yet, even while 'fear' before had been a term defined within the hierarchical relation between Mowbray and the king, Bollingbroke claims to sidestep 'fear' to avoid 'impeach[ing] his height'. Bollingbroke seems to want to recognize his own 'reverence', as opposed to Mowbray's 'fear', as both the result of his position on the hierarchy and also on the basis of personal affront that Mowbray invokes. Now, according

to Bollingbroke, Richard must not acknowledge servile fear but rather give ear to the reverence due to him by his closest subjects, to demonstrate his own royal honor and to receive Bollingbroke's favor – but, importantly, his insistence on the recognition of this claim, like that of Mowbray, seems to come from an anxiety about his status before the king.

The scene shows a complicated stew of appeals to authority, both hierarchically and interpersonally conceived. Mowbray and Bollingbroke both seem to want to be recognized as individuals, not as rungs in a hierarchy, and yet both also appeal to their relation to the king's own God-given authority. They want privileged, individual access to the king's honor and righteousness, but they also want the honor made available to them to be naturally dispensed from God's own justice. Both disputants essentially want the impossible, for the king to be endowed with divine glory and for themselves to be the special beneficiaries of that glory, not by order of hierarchical emanation, but by order of their own special, privileged, and very personal claims. In essence, they want Richard to be both as remote as a god and as close as a friend. Richard responds to this contradiction by showing force, proclaiming 'We were not born to sue, but to command' (1.1.196). One could, then, perhaps, interpret Bollingbroke's subsequent rebellion as a show of disgust toward the king's harried relation to his supposedly divine authority. In scene 3, when Bollingbroke requests to kiss Richard's hand before the contest, Richard descends and tells him 'as thy cause is right, / So be thy fortune in this royal fight!' (1.3.55-6). The fact that Richard himself stops the fight indicates his ultimate estimation of the relation between rightness and fighting. Rather than God's will emanating through the fortunes of combat – a judgment to which both Bollingbroke and Mowbray would submit themselves – Richard himself takes on the role of judge, the same 'impartial' role as in scene 1. And the impersonal tenor of Richard's sentence after the thwarted contest only exacerbates each party's initial complaint. They had wanted a king to befriend them as equals and instead got a judge whose horizontally construed authority threatens to reveal their rather muddled sense of personal honor. In a sense, then, the way that Bollingbroke goes on to overthrow Richard on account of this slight, which was only a confused response to his own confused request, shows how modern horizontal claims to authority seem to predicate within resentment toward the failures of the pre-modern model, even while it causes those failures.

But in *1 Henry IV* Bollingbroke himself eventually learns the difficulty inherent to natural claims to divine power. In scene 3 of the first act, Bollingbroke admits that he has been too lax in his royal duty of assuming a disposition befitting the king. He swears that he 'will henceforth rather be [him]self, / Mighty to be feared', to regain 'that title of respect / Which the proud soul ne'er pays but to the proud' (1.3.5-6, 8-9). Where 'fear' previously

had been an emotion unworthy of being directed toward the king, here Bollingbroke recognizes its utility. Bollingbroke expresses his royal pride as being identical with his self, and characterizes reassuming the right disposition of the king as a return to that self, admitting that lately his naturally royal 'condition… hath been smooth as oil, soft as young down' (1.3.6-7). This begs the question of how a self equated with a certain set of behaviors still maintains its identity, even while not performing those behaviors. In this moment, Bollingbroke seems at odds with himself and with the role of the king as a natural expression of self; on the one hand he needs to act the part of the strong king who can put down rebellion, and on the other, 'acting' any part easily slides to pretending. The embarrassing fact of his own historical rebellion against Richard undermines any moral or metaphysical authority he could claim to denounce other rebels and his pretended status as natural king ever plays at cross purposes with the performance of the kingly virtues that got him the crown. The difference between 'soft' nature and 'pride'-ful action also becomes apparent in Hotspur's answer to the king about the reasons why he has not yet surrendered his prisoners – his description of 'a certain lord, neat and trimly dress'd, / Fresh as a bridegroom' making immediate demands on the field of battle only just won, questioning him with 'holiday and lady terms' (1.3.33-4, 46). Hotspur ironically appeals to the king that this false lord should not come between Hotspur's 'love and [the king's] high Majesty' (1.3.68). And then the matter of Mortimer comes up. Blunt proclaims that Hotspur will remain in the king's good graces, so long as whatever untoward words he may have spoken on the field of battle he would 'unsay' now (1.3.76). But Hotspur will disavow his previous insubordination only on condition that the king pay to the rebel Glendower a ransom for his brother-in-law, Mortimer. The king, meanwhile, remains dubious about whether Mortimer was captured at all, or whether he has revolted and joined with Glendower, given that Mortimer had recently married Glendower's daughter.

The above comparison between soft nature and prideful action recalls Bollingbroke's previous distinction between 'fear' and 'reverence', and as well sets the scene for an exchange deeply significant with regard to the question of hierarchical versus interpersonal authority. The king proclaims, 'I shall never hold that man my friend / Whose tongue shall ask me for one penny cost / To ransom home revolted Mortimer' (1.3.90-2). In Bollingbroke's model, tongues appeal to the king for ransom; royal power can grant such appeals, or not. Tongues do not produce their own justice, for Bollingbroke, rather they receive it from God by way of the king. Bollingbroke here ineffectually appeals to a hierarchical model for authority because, in spite of his own ascent to the throne by other means, this model remains the most rhetorically effective in maintaining power. As of now, hierarchy is the best show going, and so Bollingbroke must play his part in it, particularly where the popular Hotspur is concerned. Ironically, it is exactly this show of power that finally seems to set Hotspur against the king. Hotspur

replies to the king's awkward tongue-metaphor by repurposing it to better effect, saying, 'He [Mortimer] never did fall off, my sovereign liege, / But by chance of war; to prove that true / Needs no more than one tongue for all those wounds, / Those mouthed wounds, which valiantly he took' (1.3.94-7). 'Tongue', in Hotspur's mouth, has several different, more impactful meanings than in Bollingbroke's telling. The word refers in one sense to the sword that created the open mouths of Mortimer's wounds; in another, to Hotspur's own tongue in recalling the story of Mortimer's valiant deeds, that which needs no other testament; in another to the king's tongue in his mockery of Mortimer, in calling him a rebel when he had proved himself a true subject. Hotspur conceives of tongues – as a metaphor both for swords and for the true reportage of facts – in service to a horizontally construed model of authority; both swords and facts properly deployed could unseat the king, a fact that Hotspur wants Bollingbroke to remember. Meanwhile, the king's accusation against Mortimer Hotspur characterizes as 'slander', later calling Bollingbroke 'ingrate and cank'red', a 'subtile king', and a 'vile politician' (1.3.112, 137, 169, 241). He also backhandedly accuses Bollingbroke with the king's own judgment against Mortimer, with resting on 'bare and rotten policy' rather than action (1.3.108). Unwisely, and in a manner certainly reminiscent of Richard's own lack of wisdom, the king here becomes drawn into Hotspur's rhetoric. Rather than dismiss Hotspur's narrative, Bollingbroke denies its veracity, saying 'Thou dost belie him, Percy, thou dost belie him; / [Mortimer] never did encounter with Glendower' (1.3.113-4). This response fails in two ways. First, it does not acknowledge the power of Hotspur's telling to the ears of the courtiers present, where the swashbuckling Mortimer meets Glendower 'in single opposition', three times breathing and three times drinking. (Hotspur employs such narrative devices as later used by Falstaff in his story about the defense of the king's purse against thieves, though this tale finds a much more receptive audience.) Bollingbroke does not understand that it barely matters whether the narrative proves true when the telling by Hotspur's 'one tongue' paints such a compelling picture. Second, in that Bollingbroke couches the tale's effectiveness in terms of its facticity, he undermines his own royal authority to make narratives true by virtue of his natural position to God. Hotspur appeals to *facts* as a way to question the king, but even by denying the veracity of this appeal, Bollingbroke sounds like only one man speaking against another, rather than the king handing down the light of God's own truth itself. Hotspur forces Bollingbroke into showing himself as a king of facts and swords, rather than a king by nature – with the strong implication that truer facts and sharper swords could prevail against him.

The plays thus present a dilemma. The king cannot rule except by appeals to natural right but cannot uphold his rule except by the consent of nobles and strength of arms. The English kings in the Henriad plays, in their order, come to terms with this problem in

various ways – Richard falling victim to it, Bollingbroke struggling to understand it, and Hal ultimately overcoming it by establishing a new theory of rule. By the middle of *2 Henry IV*, Bollingbroke still grapples with the problem of sovereignty, seeming to believe that his ascent came of some teleological force, where 'necessity so bow'd the state / That I and greatness were compell'd to kiss', while still recognizing the material threats that surround him (3.1.73-4). Earlier in this scene, Bollingbroke characterizes the 'necessity' of his reign in terms of 'the book of fate… [that] make[s] mountains level, and the continent, / Weary of solid firmness, melt itself / Into the sea' (3.1.44-8). But elsewhere in this same speech, 'necessit[ies]' appear more like accidents than fates – 'how chance's mocks / And changes fill the cup of alteration', bestowing the title of prophet to his predecessor, where Richard 'fore[told] this same time's condition' (3.1.50-1, 78). Whether by fates, prophecies, or mere chance, Bollingbroke certainly does not express his royal authority at this moment, when rebels trouble him on all sides, as the result of proud ambition or his willful seizure of the throne. Rather, Bollingbroke believes himself to be one part in a machinery, neither naturally endowed with power, as Richard had believed, nor the politicking usurper Hotspur described, but almost a victim of circumstance. One gets the sense of generational overlap between shifting models; the old has not yet died away, though the new is waiting in the wings. Neoplatonic hierarchies give way to contingency; the future comes on by 'necessity', but takes a more earthbound route. Warwick speaks of 'a history in all men's lives, / Figuring the natures of times deceas'd, / The which observ'd, a man may prophecy' (3.1.80-2). Bollingbroke himself, tied as he was to his historical moment, could not step outside history and bend it to his will; he missed his chance to observe and prophecy. The 'unease' with which the crown sits on his head comes of being pressed by circumstances outside his control (3.1.31).

Hal, however, learns from the near history of his father's reign, though unlike him, Hal 'figures the nature of times'. Like Richard, Hal's prophecies are self-fulfilling in that they are prophecies *about* himself, but unlike Richard or his father, he affords himself the privilege of selfhood by understanding that the way to the throne, and the way to self, share a similar conceptual structure. His soliloquy at the beginning of *I Henry IV* demonstrates his observation of the means to power, and he prophecies accordingly, not on the basis of his natural right to the throne, in Richard's mode, but rather on the basis of the contingency of that throne in his father's mode – and of Hal's own self-assertion in spite of these contingent ties. During the scene where Bollingbroke falls ill and Hal sits at his side, when Hal puts on the crown, of this 'imperial crown' he says, 'Lo where it sits, / Which God shall guard; and put the whole world's strength / Into one giant arm, it shall not force / This lineal honor from me' (4.5.43-6). But if the world's force cannot take the crown from him, by what merit or right does he hold it? He does not take the crown from his father by force, as Bollingbroke so anxiously fears in this scene.

Bollingbroke theorizes that Hal's 'wish' to be king was 'father… to that thought' that the king had died, and that the crown had rightfully passed on (4.4.92). Bollingbroke, thus, in essence, believes Hal *wills* himself to the throne and proceeds with a lengthy monologue on the dangers of hewing to a model of willed authority. Now at the end of his life, the king has learned that nature-figuring history befuddles the human will. And as much as he expresses fear and pain on his own behalf at the prospect of being usurped ('compound me with forgotten dust; / Give that which gave thee life unto the worms'), he also expresses fear on Hal's own behalf, that he would likewise become subject to history and its capacity to figure nature ('When that my care could not hold thy riots, / What wilt thou do when riot is thy care?') (4.5.115-6, 134-5). But Hal comforts Bollingbroke's historical anxieties. He insists that he has 'affect[ed]' the crown, that he had long been taken up with 'show[ing] th' incredulous world / The noble change that [he] hath purposed', (4.5.144, 153-4). That change he purposes does not take shape after his father's example – he does not play the role of the rough usurper, but rather that of the loyal subject. Hal confesses,

> If any rebel or vain spirit of mine
> Did with the least affection of a welcome
> Give entertainment to the might of it,
> Let God for ever keep it from my head,
> And make me as the poorest vassal is
> That doth with awe and terror kneel to it! (4.5.171-6)

So when the 'whole world's strength' would come to take his crown by force, Hal safeguards it not by equal force but by a corrective, performative 'show' to the 'incredulous world' of his own inward 'noble change' (4.5.153-4). God guards his crown 'where it sits', on his head, and Bollingbroke, for his part, prays that 'God put it in [Hal's] mind to take [the crown] hence' (4.5.178). In other words, Hal's struggle is *intellectual*, as he recognizes that the path to power follows his own intellectual self-acknowledgement and self-constitution. The 'quarrel of the true inheritor' to which Hal refers in this scene suggests an inward deliberation on the merits of one's own worth (4.4.168). According to Hal's model of authority, one must first wrestle with one's own 'thoughts to any strain of pride', then take up his father's advice to 'busy [the] giddy minds' of his new courtiers. The crown first establishes itself intellectually, then interpersonally. Bollingbroke's model of voluntarist authority – 'honor snatch'd with boisterous hand' – that had become eventually mastered by nature-figuring history, Hal overcomes first by mastering his own mind and then those of his lords. Hal's updated model rehabilitates authority by succession, but only as he himself pardons his father's sins as usurper. Bollingbroke confesses 'how he came by the crown', while Hal retroactively undermines the very basis

of that confession, while also setting up his own legitimacy to rule – 'You won it, wore it, kept it, gave it me; / Then plain and right must my possession be' (4.4.218, 221-2).

The distinction between the divine right of kings, as grounded in the neoplatonic model, and the concept of sovereignty, as defined by Bodin and Hobbes, figures centrally in the above-described problem. The former is metaphysical, while the latter is social and contingent. Bodin explicitly stated that the sovereign was subject to natural law, and yet only the king himself could judge when, and how, they kept that obligation; subjects had no recourse to hold the sovereign accountable. In the same sense that the sovereign nominally subjects himself to natural law, so does Hal everywhere assert his authority on the grounds of the old neoplatonic model while simultaneously relying on swords and facts to establish and hold his rule. But having a foot in either model of authority, as Hal does, causes no small amount of confusion and essentially causes a vacuum which Hal's cult of personality must fill. Sovereignty positions authority within the mandate of one ruler, or at least one body of rulers; this, in turn, causes obedience to that ruler to become a matter of interpreting his or her or their intentions, this especially in England where mixed monarchy required protracted cooperation between king and Parliament, and thus required this interpretation to *enact*, much less to obey, legislative rule, as opposed to more blatantly absolutist governments on the continent. The Henriad plays discuss the institutional angst that comes of not knowing for certain the inward intentions of the sovereign, whether that lack concerns the grounds for attaining, or holding, royal authority or whether it concerns the ways subjects choose between conflicting claims to power.

The Henriad plays thus ask several questions: Where does the performance of kingship reside, in the corporate body of the state or the individual mind of the ruler? Is power held by strength of arms or conferred by a hierarchy of forms? And within my reading, these questions are charged with adjacent questions on the mind-body problem, and the problem of other minds. In *Richard II*, Richard implores,

> Cover your heads and mock not flesh and blood
> With solemn reverence: throw away respect,
> Tradition, form, and ceremonious duties,
> For you have but mistook me all this while,
> I live with bread like you, feel want,
> Taste grief, need friends: subjected thus,
> How can you say to me I am a king? (3.2.171-7).

The idea that Richard is 'subjected' (made subject to the 'need' of 'friends' and also made a subject, an individual agent divorced from the emanative will of God) has something to do with the modern distinction between behaviorism and dualism, or between 'bundles of behavior' and mind. We see a deliberation between kingship as a behavior, performed outwardly, befitting 'tradition, form, and ceremonious duties', and kingship as a sort of cognition, where the king that 'feels want' and 'tastes grief' functions alongside the king that is immutable and 'subject' to no one. Richard's dawning realization of his status against the dualism at center of kingship itself suggests the Cartesian moment of reflexive mind, where a self only wondered at comes into focus through the act of self-recognition. So the problem of interpretation noted by many early modern scholars, including Rabkin, concerning theories of authority, to me, reflects only half the difficulty; the other half is that the problem of accession so central to these plays itself is a problem of interpretation, and that the inscrutability of Hal operates as one way Shakespeare discusses royal accession as a part of this interpretive problem. Even while the audience of either theater, the dramatic and political, cannot interpret Hal, Hal interprets *himself* as king and sets up his rule on the basis of that self-interpretation. The self as a cognizing, interpreting agent requires self-recognition in relation to others within shared theories of meaning – but, as shown above in Richard's speech, most characters do not seem aware of these problems, except after it is too late. Hal, however, begins his story (in the soliloquy at the beginning of *1 Henry IV*) by showing the complex relation between the king as he exists in the minds of others, and the king's own realization of himself.

As a way further into the uncomfortable angst toward theories of authority in the Henriad plays, note the episode with Aumerle toward the end of *Richard II*. Aumerle's treachery, and his father York's response to it, show the conflict between a vertically aligned metaphysics of power based in natural law and one horizontally aligned, more based in social facts and positive law, and how both dynamics become instantiated within the personal lives of royal subjects. York begins this episode by lamenting the declined state of England, and the tragedy of Richard's deposition:

> As in a theatre the eyes of men,
> After a well-graced actor leaves the stage,
> Are idly bent on him that enters next,
> Thinking his prattle to be tedious,
> Even so, or with much more contempt, men's eyes
> Did scowl on gentle Richard (5.1.23-8).

The use of the theater metaphor highlights the performativity of royal authority in this historical moment of the play cycle, when whoever appears the strongest and has the favor

of the nobles can become the anointed ruler. York shows both reluctance and steadfastness in expressing his loyalty to his new king, the attitude of someone whose fealty is itself somewhat performed; the tension and strife of Bollingbroke's ascent to power has already bled down within his court, creating an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty. Part of this confusion comes of how to think about where Bollingbroke's authority actually lay. Has he become king because of his power, or does he wield power because he's king? This is the classical thought experiment, Euthyphro's dilemma, restated by an early modern playwright in late-medieval monarchical terms.[20] York holds more traditional notions of royalty, where power issues down commonly to all from God's dispensation. As opposed to law issuing from Bollingbroke's authority, the king himself is subject to ancient precedent. But it is the manner of Bollingbroke's ascent that makes this attitude so difficult to hold in earnest. When York learns of his son Aumerle's participation in a plot to kill Bollingbroke, it is as if he is suddenly given opportunity to put action behind an only half-held position. York pushes away confusion and discontent, showing strong loyalty to the king, though it is unclear whether this loyalty is grounded in a theory of the personal sovereignty of the king – that is, to the social facts that establish the power of Bollingbroke as regent – or to the vertically aligned understanding of his authority based in natural law. Aumerle seems motivated by the illegality of Bollingbroke's ascent, but it is unclear whether York has loyalty to the concept of the king, or to the actual king. And just as York himself seems of two minds, so does Aumerle excuse his treachery with the claim that his 'heart is not confederate with [his] hand' (5.3.53). This angst, or doubleness, which had been enforced upon Richard, now has spread to those subject under Bollingbroke. The king's dualist nature, and the implications of that division for policy, have caused royal subjects to think and act against themselves, against their own interests and families. But this doubleness serves Hal as he re-legitimizes the crown, taking up the metaphysics recently made dubious through Bollingbroke's usurpation of Richard and turns it into a rhetorical tool to establish his own power.

[20] Euthyphro's dilemma refers to an often quotes section of Plato's *Euthyphro*, wherein Socrates asks the titular character whether the holy is loved by the gods because he is holy, or is he holy because he is loved by the gods; see *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 179. This problem has come to stand for difficulties surrounding the sovereignty and righteousness of God. Is God righteous because everything He does is righteous, or should his righteousness be held to some standard of righteousness adjacent to God Himself – in which case, by what virtue should one call God the highest authority? Opposing answers to this question tend to organize according to Thomist intellectualism on one hand, and Ockhamist voluntarism (or 'divine command theory') on the other.

Consider also the robbery in *Henry IV Part 1*, which can be said to demonstrate the problem of other minds quite clearly, where authority depends on the interpretation of others' intentions. Hal contrives to 'stuff [his] purses full of crowns' (1.2.131-2) in the scheme to rob the traders with Poins and Falstaff. But the scene from Hal's and Poins's perspective scans as a light-hearted joke only because Hal's position at court protects them from facing real legal peril. The terms of the prank dictate that he wear a disguise; if he had appeared as himself, it seems doubtful the traders would have prevented him from seizing their goods, or prevented him in any way. Compare the masked performance of Hal's cast off nobility to the way Hal 'wins' the throne at Agincourt and in so doing erases all doubt of his merits to rule, when, legally speaking, the throne already would be rightfully due him by inheritance. In either scenario, the action (stealing money, winning a battle) is more valuable for its effect than its substance; Hal performs a sort of rhetorical argument with the 'stealing' of money that he already could claim by virtue of his position of power, as well as in the winning of a crown that already falls to him by law of inheritance. And likewise, the question of whether Falstaff knew Hal's and Poins's gambit, as Falstaff claims, parallels that of whether subjects of the king can be said to know that the claim Hal makes to the throne, in fact, resolves the opposition of metaphysical and social claims to authority. After the scheme, Falstaff swears he knew what they had been playing at, because he was called out on it; one could characterize the moment when Richard's or Bollingbroke's subjects 'call out' their kings on the legality of their action, whether they knew all along that all the talk of the divine supremacy of the king was just as empty as Falstaff's boasting. In either scenario, a fictive identity operates at the level of rhetorical persuasion, while also masking a more practically oriented legal right. Likewise, the play extempore in the Eastcheap tavern (at 2.4.375-481), wherein both Falstaff and Hal 'stand for' the king, highlights the understanding they have of the representative, which is to say epistemic, nature of the authority of the king. As opposed to the model of authority based in divine dispensation, in which the lieutenant of God participates within the essential substance of God's being, the representative of God performs nobility. The speech Falstaff gives at the end of their play (at 2.4.466-90), suggests how the problem of other minds articulates these several issues. Asked whether Hal (played here by Falstaff himself) 'knows' Falstaff (played here by Hal), Falstaff-as-Hal answers, 'But to say I know more harm in him than in myself, were to say more than I know'. While this line certainly should be read as ironic, it also shows that the inference of others' experience as based in one's own experience falls well short of 'knowledge'. One performs for the other in like manner that the king performs for his subjects. But the several roles of these characters, within their positions of royal estate and their sometimes hidden identities, become manifest epistemically, not metaphysically, and the lack of certainty of that epistemic state of affairs as a basis for knowledge creates an anxious atmosphere where each must 'interpret' the mind of the other.

II. Neo-Platonist Emanation and the 'Inside' and 'Outside' of Law

Sixteenth-century England saw the centralization of royal authority and the rise of the sovereignty of the king-in-parliament, particularly in the application of law. Howell A. Lloyd calls the question of legislative sovereignty the most significant political issue of the sixteenth-century Europe, though current legal scholars, as did early modern ones, do not readily agree as to which body held final sovereignty in England, the king or parliament.[21] Holdsworth writes that throughout the Tudor monarchies '[t]he permanent government of the state was carried on by the king and [the king's] Council, [that] [t]hey determined the policy of the state [and] initiated all important legislation'.[22] Meanwhile, J.P. Sommerville paints a slightly more complex picture pertaining to the relations between parliament and king:

> From the 1530s the Tudor Parliament was in many respects a sovereign legislature. Early Stuart lawyers believed that Parliament was the supreme judicial and legislative authority in the land. In this sense, it was sovereign… In the theory of Bodin and the English absolutists the king was a sovereign, accountable to no human authority, but having a duty to abide by the laws of God and nature. In the theory of the lawyers, it was not the king alone but the king-in-Parliament who was sovereign, and Parliament's decrees were inferior not only to those of God and nature, but also to the fundamental precepts of the common law.[23]

But while opinions vary on which sovereignty mattered more, legal scholars in either timeline would find it difficult to deny that the distinction between *original* and *received* power figured as a prominent conceptual tool within acts of intra-governmental

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[21] 'Amid the upheavals and sectarian conflicts of sixteenth-century Europe proponents of resistance arrived, it has been claimed, at "a recognizably modern secularised thesis about the natural rights and original sovereignty of the people"… Whatever its modernity, that thesis stood opposed in the era of Renaissance courts and princes to the theory of regal power, reinforced in the course of the period by a new concept of the state as the locus of legislative power. It is in these rival theses, both coherently enough expressed, that the prime achievements of sixteenth-century political thought are most obviously to be found'; see Howell A. Lloyd, 'Constitutionalism' in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700*, ed. by J.H. Burns with the assistance of Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991), pp. 254-97 (pp. 256-7). Quotation taken from Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), II, p. 338.

[22] Holdsworth, p. 88.

[23] J.P. Sommerville, *Royalists and Patriots: Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 100.

interpretation. The *realpolitik* of the English state, both as centered around the king *solus* and in parliament entailed a more frequent use of statutes, proclamations, and ordinances, as opposed to common law – and the authority of the king-in-parliament relied upon the concept of his original power.[24] This is not to minimize the political pressure exerted by the crown on appointee judges who presided over common law courts. The main distinction I mean to draw is one concerning conceptual underpinnings, particularly those of the enhanced importance of positivist theory that allowed the king and his legislators to 'make' law rather than reveal it. As Holdsworth writes,

> [l]aw was no longer a rule of conduct which taught men 'honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere'. Rather it was *quod principi placuit* – the command of the sovereign. Customary law was only law so long as he suffered it to exist. Both the existence of law and its contents depended upon him alone; and in this fact the whole essence of sovereignty was summed up.[25]

The king-in-parliament thus exercised a creative mandate, as opposed to a received one. James Daly describes how the distinction between original and received power extends even to the early modern legal definition of the word 'absolute'.

> Absolute queens or duchesses are said to be those who enjoy the titles in their own right, rather than that of their husbands. The same note of full personal possession is struck in a different meaning, where the kings of the Saxon heptarchy each 'absolutely' reigned 'in his countrie each, not under the subjection of other'. This

[24] As Quentin Skinner notes, the practice of English common law came to be focused in the early modern period less on prudence and 'right reason' than the precedent of custom and the 'ancient constitution': 'Hitherto, the idea of Justinian's Code as "written reason", together with the high prestige attached to scholastic philosophy, had meant that the concepts of right reason and the law of nature had been used almost universally as touchstones for the analysis of law, obligation and justice. With the attack on Roman Law as *ratio scripta*, however, this degree of consensus about the foundations of political argument began to dissolve… [D]iscussions about legal and political principles tended to resolve increasingly into discussions about historical precedents. Correspondingly, history became ideology: the conduct of political argument came to be founded to an increasing extent on the presentation of rival theses about the alleged dictates of various 'ancient constitutions"'. See Skinner, I, p. 208. But as humanist elites looked to ever more high-minded legal justifications for common law practice, statute law became more pragmatic. Indeed, as Skinner notes, a major theme in the humanist-penned 'mirror-for-princes' genre of advice books was the prevalence of a growing individualism among the nobility, the tendency to seize power for one's own rather than think of the good of the commonwealth, even while claiming power on the basis of the 'ancient constitution' (I, p. 223).

[25] Holdsworth, pp. 292-3.

> complete independence of external powers comes to be one of the most widely accepted usages in the reign of James I.[26]

Lower magistrates enjoy their *received*, which is to say less agented, power through a sort of analogy with the power of the king; they do not originate power, rather their power flows from one above them on the hierarchy. Sommerville distinguishes royal power that is *transferred* from the populace and that which is *designated* by the populace, tracing this distinction to the influence of neoplatonism.[27] The neoplatonic understanding of divine authority entails the principle of emanation; at the top of the hierarchy resides The Good, or The One, which creates everything below it by way of an outpouring of its essence.[28] All separate beings on the hierarchy are, in fact, emanations of the One that creatively issues forth everything that exists within a divine unity. Difference and decay were both privations of that unified form. Natural law holds all men under its purview, bound to their place on the hierarchy, while positive law 'created' by parliament, or by declarations handed down by the king, meanwhile, must take into account the inside and outside of the mental processes by which those laws came into being.

The ways that the distinction between original and received power parallels the debates between legal positivism versus medieval natural law are not necessarily obvious. Nonetheless, they are vital in their elaboration of themes that pervade early modern thought. Thomas Eliot clarifies one side of the equation, describing positive law, as made by the king-in-parliament, to be the highest legislative authority. Writing in 1565 (though not published until 1583) in 'The Commonwealth of England', he states:

> The most high and absolute power of the Realm of England consisteth in the Parliament... That which is done by this consent is called firm, stable, and *sanctum*, and is taken for law... For every Englishman is intended to be there

[26] James Daly, 'The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century England', *The Historical Journal* 21. 2 (1978), 227-50 (p. 228).

[27] 'It was God alone…who granted the ruler power. Modern Catholics refer to this approach as "designation theory". In the early seventeenth century Protestant absolutists such as James I and his supporters adopted strikingly similar views. Indeed, "designation theory" was the orthodoxy of early Stuart absolutists'; see Sommerville, p. 22.

[28] 'The concept of sovereignty was itself underpinned by attitudes toward human nature and needs: in order to fulfill God's purposes and his own goals, man required the protection of an absolute sovereign… Monarchy upon earth corresponded most closely to God's rule over the universe, to the eagle's dominion over birds, and to the government of that puzzlingly feminine monarch the queen bee over the hive – a model commonwealth. Such analogies, underpinned by a Neoplatonic conception of the universe as a hierarchy, in which each part was related to all the others by similitude or correspondence, featured in absolutist writings throughout the century'; see Sommerville, pp. 351-2.

> present either in person or by procuration and attorney, of what pre-eminence, state, dignity, or quality soever he be, from the Prince (be he King or Queen) to the lowest person of England. And the consent of the Parliament is taken to be every man's consent.[29]

John Fortescue, meanwhile, writing in 1471 in *Governance of England* puts his finger on the difference between two types of monarchy, that of the *dominum tantum regale* in France and the *dominum politicum et regale* within England, placing both under an immutable natural law to which all law must adhere. 'Oh how great and to be extolled with all praise is that law of nature to which all human laws are obedient…', writes Fortescue. 'This law is the mother of all human laws, and if they degenerate from her they deserve not to be called laws'.[30] As R.W.K. Hinton notes, Fortescue clearly values this medieval sense of natural law over that made by man:

> [O]ver and above what Fortescue said directly about the English constitution, he also said a good deal about the law of nature, and it is impossible to admit even the existence of the law of nature without meaning that it is superior to man-made laws... [A]nd if this was really Fortescue's belief it does bring us back to the proposition that the English constitution as Fortescue saw it was limited rather than parliamentary. This unchangeable or natural law would doubtless be the very law by which the people had originally consented to be governed.[31]

Such 'consent', therefore, is not modern popular consent but hearkens to something like Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelian understanding of human free will as ruled by a desire for the good, or that which natural law reveals. In the early modern period we see a transition from an Aristotelian understanding of natural law, where '[n]atural justice was served by submitting to what nature had ultimately dictated according to the goal of each creature, a goal given by its very nature', wherein the obligations of humankind existed within its relation to God's natural order, to a sense of natural law more reconciled to positive law, such as that promulgated by Francis Suarez, wherein 'laws specific to each community were positive and open to negotiation, [and] that divine eternal law was only known in a

[29] Quoted in Frederick Pollock, 'Sovereignty in English Law', *Harvard Law Review* 8.5 (1894), 243-51 (p. 244).

[30] Quoted in R.W.K. Hinton, 'English Constitutional Doctrines from the Fifteenth Century to the Seventeenth: I. English Constitutional Theories from Sir John Fortescue to Sir John Eliot', *The English Historical Review*, 75.296 (1960), 401-25 (p. 414).

[31] Hinton, 414.

very general sense'.[32] Compare this to going theories on free will, as informed by an early modern mechanistic worldview, and under the influence of the Ockhamist disavowal of real universals, where final and formal causes have been abolished and only efficient causes carry any deterministic purchase. Thomas Aquinas's sense of free will, meanwhile, involves intellectual inclination toward the Good, and the hearkening toward a teleological model of the universe in which final and formal causes retain value. Within this Thomist understanding of human will, Parliament would reveal or discover consent toward the Good, and not originate it, and in fact the value of discovery can be measured analogically by comparison to the goodness of natural law. 'Consent' as referenced by Eliot, however, is much more in line with the modern sense of this word, where the will of the people, as represented in Parliament, originates within acts of legislation, and not through analogy to other forms of law, but within the sociality of government itself. Eliot's consent is horizontal and social and involves the original authority of parliament as a representative of the people, while Fortescue's is vertical and analogical and involves correspondence to a higher metaphysical law. Implicit within this distinction, however, is a parallel distinction between first- and second-order philosophical acts. Vertical consent *emanates* from a metaphysical good; here, temporal law and natural law share the same essence by way of this process of emanation. Such power is one; it is, essentially, one action. Horizontal consent *represents* the good will of the people, which requires correspondence between two philosophical acts, one made by the people within their will and the other by the law in its capacity to represent that will – two actions that may or may not correspond, and which require interpretation in their correspondence, or lack thereof.

Another way to put it would be to compare *mere* power and *delegated* power. Mere power is a second order act, socially construed, where the strength of the action corresponds, or does not correspond, representationally to the will of a higher power. Delegated power, meanwhile, is an outflowing or emanation of an original act. Julian H. Franklin expands on this distinction, writing on Bodin's delineation between the power of a sovereign from that which would be held as a right of office by ordinary magistrates: 'To say that a magistrate "held" or "had" a power by his right of office had been taken, by most medieval jurists, to mean that he could exercise that power according to his own discretion and without direct reliance on the king, so long as he remained within whatever legal

[32] Robert von Friedburg, 'The Rise of Natural Law in the Early Modern Period' in *The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology, 1600-1800*, ed. by Ulrich L. Lehner, Richard A. Muller, and A.G. Roeber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 625-41 (pp. 628 and 632).

limits might apply'.[33] Franklin thus delineates between a more servile, delegated power, and *merum imperium*, pure power, which originated from the official himself. So the advent of a greater prominence for positive law, in a somewhat like manner to the transfer from Thomist natural law theory to legal positivism, entails a parallel shift from the immutable, spiritual source of law to the personal source of the sovereign. This difference, particularly in service of a dualist understanding of mind, reinforces the distinction of an 'inside' and 'outside' to law, as noted in my reading of Agamben, predicated on a personal, rather than an all-pervasive, source of power. As mentioned, Agamben writes that the 'paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order'.[34] But definitions of sovereignty as a paradoxical resolution to the legal dualism described above should also take into account a parallel dualism of the *consciousness* of authority on the part of various political players. And it is the parallelism between these two dualities that positions the Henriad plays' discussion on the nature of that authority and sovereignty so well within the problem of other minds.

The moment at 5.2.72 of *2 Henry IV* offers a good example of the parallel dualisms that I mean, when the Chief Justice defends himself against the newly crowned King Henry V:

> I then did use the person of your father,
> The image of his power lay then in me,
> And in th' administration of his law,
> Whiles I was busy for the commonwealth,
> Your Highness pleased to forget my place,
> The majesty and power of law and justice,
> The image of the King whom I presented,
> And strode me in the very seat of judgment (5.2.73-80).

This entire exchange is a profound litigation of the difference between received and original authority, and between that of the conceptual foundation of natural law versus personal sovereignty. Hal's response to the Chief Justice at 5.2.102 is also telling, in that he accepts and even celebrates his judgment:

> So shall I live to speak my father's words:

[33] Julian H. Franklin 'Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and His Critics' in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700*, ed. by. J.H. Burns with the assistance of Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 298-328 (p. 299).

[34] Agamben, p. 15.

> ‘Happy am I, that have a man so bold,
> That dares do justice on my proper son;
> And not less happy, having such a son
> That would deliver up his greatness so
> Into the hands of justice.’ (5.2.107-12).

This recalls the ambitious and manipulative game Hal has played by putting on the semblance of a waster only to reemerge as the rightful heir and seem all the more worthy of inheritance, that which he mentions in his soliloquy in *1 Henry IV* at 1.2.196-217, and which Bollingbroke all but repeats in his advice to Hal several acts later. Hal’s maneuver is an act of personal sovereignty, which this Chief Justice lawfully rebukes. It is ironic that he does so on the authority of Bollingbroke, when Bollingbroke’s own advice to Hal would seem to encourage him to behave *more* like a sovereign, not less. Part of Hal’s ascent to the throne is to take up the rhetoric of this Chief Justice in the latter’s rebuke of his (Hal’s) own past behavior, to agree with the Chief Justice’s condemnation, and so put on the image of natural law. However, this rhetorical move is itself an act of personal sovereignty (one for which Falstaff becomes collateral damage, a figure whose entire life becomes a sacrifice to a publicity stunt). Hal does not actually forgo his sovereignty with his response to the Chief Justice, but has learned from the mistakes of his predecessors to appear as if he were doing so while simultaneously using this appearance for his own personal ends. This is an example, then, of a representationally defined, second-order sovereign act, an act of Hal’s own personal sovereignty, taking the guise of an emanationally defined, first-order act, or an act of received authority and, really, of obedience to his father, through the person of the Chief Justice. He pretends to obey the received power of his father here, knowing full well that he is actually acting in his own personal capacity, even while simultaneously bringing about his father’s will for his full sovereignty and his own will to rule.

On the personal, even Cartesian, manner in which he performs this extended maneuver, see 4.1.31 of *Henry V*, where Hal performs a similar dance. Hal proclaims to his nobles before battle, ‘I and my bosom must debate a while, / And then I would have no company’ (4.1.31-2). But then, rather than consult his own ‘bosom’, he disguises himself and searches the opinion of his soldiers, such that his ‘bosom’ almost seems to be socially constituted. During this episode, where the speech at 4.1.100 perhaps is the most telling, Hal shows himself at his most vulnerable, exposing his humanity to his troops, though without actually revealing his identity. He lowers his power to the level of any common man’s concerns and thus addresses those concerns from the position of one likewise held under natural law. One is reminded of the ‘cares taken up’ speech in *Richard II*, where even as Richard descends the throne, his ‘cares remain his own’. Like Richard, Hal keeps

his cares, while the instrument, and subject, of his inward meditation becomes concretized within the sociality of his men. But his true identity remains separate and, in a sense, safeguarded from that identity constructed through social facts, and the socially construed difference between his position and theirs. This de-identified Hal 'has no company' and 'debates within his own bosom', even while using the company of his men as a sounding board to reflect back his own musings on law and the ethical implications of war. The moment suggests a dualism of self – a self that remains hidden behind a disguise and a parallel self that is constituted through sociality with others. Another telling moment happens in Act 4 at of the same play. Here we see a common soldier, Williams, arguing with the king on a philosophy of royal culpability (4.1.134-185). Williams argues that the king's cause should be righteous, elsewise he will have 'a heavy reckoning to make' on the last day of judgment. While this does not necessarily argue for natural law understanding of authority, the emphasis of Williams's argument is to hold the king to the same legalities as everyone else, commonly. But Hal argues otherwise, saying instead that 'every subject's duty is to the king; but every subject's soul is his own'. Hal references a vertical relation between the individual and the Almighty, but he does so in service to a horizontally-motivated defense of the personal sovereignty of the king. Hal everywhere makes use of the doubleness of shifting political mores and uncertain metaphysical foundations to further his own legend and to instill his own sense of divine legitimacy to rule. He internalizes the doubled angst of a politics come under duress of extreme skepticism and uses that doubleness as an instrument to secure his own authority.

III. Hal as Cartesian Anti-Hero

The reason proto-Cartesian ideas figure so prominently with regard to Hal has to do with the shift from correspondence within a vertically aligned hierarchical authority to representation within a socially aligned authority, or from first-order to second-order philosophical acts. Copleston notes that 'Descartes is interested with the *ordo cognoscendi* or the order of discovery, not with the *ordo essendi* or the order of being. In the latter order God is [ontologically] prior… But in the order of discovery one's own existence is prior'.[35] One could argue that law originating with a sovereign, whether parliament or king, as opposed to a metaphysical emanation of hierarchical unity, follows the same conceptual road map. Whereas the *cogito* determines self as mind through a reflexive moment of self-identification, the state determines the king first through the king's own mind, and then through the assessment of other minds, or other nodes of the corporate mind, as it were, within the state – this is self-identification writ large, on a

[35] Copleston, p. 79

national scale. Within the *cogito*, the logical inference of mind occurs by way of the acknowledgement of the fact of doubt; the distinction between metaphysical being and epistemological seeming collapses. A similar move happens in the rationale for a particular member of the state to become the king, or the head of state. If the state corporately believes a certain person to be the king, then he is the king, just as in the case where the individual mind knows that he exists, because he doubts. In either case, it's the thinking that makes it so, and in either case, knowledge asserts itself not necessarily through a correspondence between inward and outward data, not through Augustinian verification, but rather through the necessary logic of a certain state of affairs, given the fact of that state of affairs being inwardly oriented. As Copleston writes, concerning the *cogito*:

> I intuit in my own case the necessary connection between my thinking and my existing. That is to say, I intuit in a concrete case the impossibility of my thinking without my existing. And I express this intuition in the presupposition *Cogito, ergo sum*. Logically speaking, this proposition presupposes a general premise. But this does not mean that I first think of a general premise and then draw a particular conclusion. On the contrary, my explicit knowledge of the general premise follows my intuition of the objective and necessary connection between my thinking and my existing.[36]

The determination of mind is inwardly oriented, because Cartesian doubt has eliminated all outward input. Likewise, the determination of the identity of the king is inwardly oriented, where the state is concerned, because the fact of a state *being* a state means, among other things, that it determines its own leader. Both inwardnesses are logically determined, based on the going rules of philosophical inquiry. Just as a self determined by outward signs or inferences does not count as a self, according to radical, Cartesian skepticism, so a state in which a leader is determined for it, whether by God or some other legal or ethical power, does not count as a state, according to the rationale of sovereignty.

The Henriad, likewise, rehearses the transition from metaphysics to epistemics, from a hierarchical chain of being to a rhetorically negotiated disparity between being and seeming, one which, within the history of thought, comes to a sort of resolution within Descartes's *cogito*. With the *cogito* the distinction between being and seeming collapses, because within the terms Descartes sets, seeming *is* being. Hal resolves the crisis of authority at the bottom of his father's reign by recognizing it more essentially as a crisis of identity, which instantiates in a decidedly epistemic, even Cartesian, manner. By

[36] Ibid, p. 92.

showing his own awareness of the performance of king, even while standing within the so-called 'right' of rule, Hal both reiterates his father's critique of the divinely inspired ruler while directing that interrogative attitude within; Hal's reflection on the nature of authority finds its object in the inward, future possibilities of authority rather than its outward, past shortcomings.

At 4.1.107 of *Richard II*, York seems to speak the paradox of this play and the source of the political angst that pervades the entire Henriad:

> Great Duke of Lancaster, I come to thee
> From plume-pluck'd Richard, who with willing soul
> Adopts [thee] heir, and his sceptre yields
> To the possession of thy royal hand.
> Ascend his throne, descending now from him,
> And long live Henry, fourth of that name! (4.1.107-12)

Note the sequence of this. 'Now' Richard descends, such that Bollingbroke can ascend. Richard steps down from the crown, before Bollingbroke goes up. Bollingbroke ascends on the basis of a law that binds the king within its mandate. However, once bound, the king has lost his power and must yield to another who attains power, in Bollingbroke's case, not by the law he claims but by the strength of arms and the consent of the nobles he has shown. Social facts decide the power, not immutable natural law, whatever either king might claim. So we see a paradox, where the king cannot maintain power except through the illusion of being above the law, but while in power he must also be bound by the law, and thus also by the social facts, the precedent and common usage that determine the law. This is a paradox that neither Richard, nor Bollingbroke understand, but which Hal does. He understands that the divine immutability of the king's power has become a rhetorical tool that the king uses to establish his *de facto* power; the fiction of emanation serves to create an authority predicated on personal sovereignty. Neither theory on its own will do, rather it is their interrelation that determines real royal power. The rest of this scene demonstrates this paradox. Carlisle questions how a king's subject can bring the king to justice. Richard himself ponders the question of the king's dualist nature, how he can be king of his royal sorrows still, even while in the act of handing over the 'cares' of that office to another. Richard even counts himself among the 'sort of traitors' that hands over the monarchy to the rule of law, giving 'his soul's consent / T' undeck the pompous body of a king; / Made glory base, [and] sovereignty a slave; / Proud majesty a subject, state a peasant' (4.1.246-52). But an important line showing how the transfer of this angst from the public to the inward, private sphere can be found at 4.1.172-4 of this same scene. 'God save the King! Will no man say amen? / Am I both priest and clerk?

Well then, amen. / God save the king!' This shows that, for Richard, social offices have become internalized and self-appointed, a reality that Hal later appropriates to his benefit but which Richard, in this moment, does not. Richard says to Bollingbroke, 'we do debase ourselves, cousin, do we not, / To look so poorly and to speak so fair?' (3.3.128-9). This inconsistency between word and deed is essentially the same that Hal performs within his Machiavellian ruse to hide his intention to power, and which Bollingbroke complains about to Hal concerning his mingling with commoners. Then Falstaff asks during the play extempore as Bollingbroke: 'If then, thou being son to me, here's the point: why being son to me, are thou so pointed at?' (2.4.405). Hal's previous soliloquy, where he indicates his plan to power, shows that he understands this doubleness as the condition of the rhetorically instantiated kingship, while Richard's 'priest and clerk' speech shows he has recognized the dilemma he faces only after the fact of losing power, but not the way through to solving it.

Returning to 4.5.165 of *Henry IV, Part 2*, we get Hal's difference from his predecessors demonstrated, in my terms, rather plainly. As mentioned before, in this scene, Hal has put on his father's crown, after thinking Bollingbroke was dead. Then the king wakes up, grieved to see his son so quickly take up his crown. Hal responds, that he only 'tr[ies]' with the crown 'as with an enemy that had before my face murdered my father, the quarrel of a true inheritor…' This quarrel is one between merit construed socially based on whether the inheritor deserves to inherit according to the opinions of his subjects, and a legality determined purely by precedent and custom. Within this same exchange, Bollingbroke more or less persuades Hal to reject Falstaff, having already persuaded him to reject Richard's demeanor at court. Bollingbroke's intent becomes apparent in his speech during the upbraiding mentioned before, at 4.5.124 of *Henry IV, Part 1*:

> Have you a ruffin that will swear, drink, dance
> Revel the night, rob, murder, and commit
> The oldest sins the newest kind of ways?
> Be happy, he will trouble you no more.
> England shall double gild his treble guilt,
> England shall give him office, honor, might;
> For the Fifth Harry from curb'd license plucks
> The muzzle of restraint, and the wild dog
> Shall flesh his tooth on every innocent (4.5.124-32).

According to Bollingbroke, the way forward is not to thumb one's nose at authority in either Falstaff's or Richard's manner, but to take up the practice of authority in a way that meets its conditions – in essence to behave like a king. But Hal is already miles ahead of

him; rather than behavioristically attaining power, he appropriates the externally defined premises of that power within his own reflexively defined point of view, to play his own game. Bollingbroke says 'And now my death / Changes the mood, for what in me was purchas'd / Falls upon thee in a more fairer sort; / So thou the garland wear'st successively' (4.5.198-201). The 'purchas'd' crown is an excellent expression of the power that comes of personal sovereignty, as opposed to that worn through customary succession. In *Henry V*, Exeter states that Hal can claim holdings in France on the basis of 'law of nature and nations' and 'all wide-stretched honors that pertain by custom, and the ordinance of the times' (2.4.79-83). Hal, in essence, then, claims his rights by natural law. Exeter, representing Hal, then challenges the French king, at lines 97-8, 'even if you hide the crown in your hearts, there will he rake for it'. Again we have a doubleness, an opposition between the theory of personal sovereignty, that which would be held in a rival's heart and must be wrested out by a challenger and thus 'purchas'd', and the claim to customary inheritance. Hal's claim to rule of France is based both in law and in his assumed ability to 'purchase' it by force. But Hal also uses the rhetoric of personal sovereignty at 3.3.8-44, where he threatens Harfleur with rape and child murder to achieve dominance of their stronghold. However, we see Henry contradicting himself in his exhortation that 'there be nothing compelled from the villages; nothing taken but paid for' (3.6.107). Henry always uses either side of the equation for his own ends, depending on his immediate needs.

The St. Crispian's Day speech from *Henry V* recalls the speech Falstaff gives on honor in *I Henry IV*, where the latter proclaims that honor means nothing to the dead but only the living, who remember. Hal's speech, likewise, describes honor as a thing remembered, though unlike Falstaff, he dangerously assumes that those 'happy few' of his company will live to claim that honor of remembrance. Hal's and Falstaff's speeches are both about the social facts of honor, who remembers, what happens after the fighting comes to an end. But Hal's reckoning of this sociality is inwardly oriented; 'all things be ready if our minds be', he insists, meaning that one addresses the social facts that determine law and the honorable acts that uphold that sociality, through first steeling one's inward self. Hal commits himself to kingship and attaining the means to power, as his early soliloquy shows, before he begins to think about establishing a theory of rule; it is a reality first in his mind. Royal authority takes form by way of radical self-conceptualization, akin to Descartes's self-evident logical certainty based on the fact of intellectual action, once having taken place, giving credence to the engine of that action; Hal believes he is sovereign in the world, because he is first sovereign in his mind. His personal sovereignty begins first in his mind, then extends outward to his realm.

Hal also demonstrates the epistemic orientation of his attitude toward Falstaff in their final scene in *Henry IV, Part 2*, when he rejects him so cruelly. Hal says to Falstaff:

> I know thee not, old man, fall to thy prayers.
> How ill white hairs becomes a fool and a jester!
> I have long dreamt of such a kind of man,
> So surfeit-swell'd, so old, and so profane;
> But being awak'd, I do despise my dream (5.5.47-51)

Their dealings had been a dream, having taken place all within Hal's own inward perception, but now that he has 'wak'd', and thus othered Falstaff, he finds the remembered image worthy of scorn, or so he says. A man that before had been as close to Hal as his own psyche he now tears from himself, such that they become two separate, alienated beings. But as Hal had indicated in his first soliloquy, this breaking off from his old self to 'redeem time when men think least [he] will' had been his plan all along. This 'dream', then, is yet another convenient fiction. It is as if the perpetually disguised Hal had learned from Falstaff within his own bosom, in like manner to his lessons when disguised with his men before Agincourt, about the paradoxical, doubled theory of authority, and now, no longer in need of a tutor, can discard him on the pretext of a sort of conversion. Hal must publicly reject Falstaff, because the latter represents all the disjointed angst associated with destabilized structures of authority, this in spite of the fact that Hal, perhaps, has internalized and appropriated that disjointedness into his political lexicon as a result of Falstaff's influence. By the time Bollingbroke charges Hal to act the part of the king in Act 3, Scene 2 of *Henry IV, Part 1*, Hal was already long in the practice of putting on plays extempore with Falstaff on that very subject. This final rejection is just another scene within Hal's long-running pantomime acting the part of a king.

But then how does Hal's internalization of shifting theories on authority project onto Rabkin's observations on the doubleness of interpretive possibility in Hal's character? In a sense, transferring emphasis to the problem of other minds only reiterates Rabkin's contention that Hal's several interpretive possibilities are each 'based on total readings of a consistent whole'. Except that Rabkin does not acknowledge that the philosophical foundation of knowledge, or that of being a 'consistent whole', has itself become complicated within the political thought of this period. Political 'knowing', where knowledge becomes enlisted as a philosophical key term in the trend toward skepticism, has itself become unstable. There is not at this moment a separate, stable metaphysical basis for knowledge to aspire to, which Rabkin's take on 'separate, stable' interpretations would seem to rely on; and the knowledge one aspires to within the act of interpretation

is only marginally more stable than the skepticism one flees from. Indeed, this quagmire of recursive skepticism would be one of the motivations behind Descartes's argument for 'clear and distinct ideas', and the general Enlightenment project of certainty that develops in the seventeenth century. The Henriad plays both demonstrate the pervasiveness of the skeptical mode and anticipate the philosophical movement within which that mode would be most effectively addressed.